As the United States approaches another pivotal election season, several state officials have expressed growing unease about the capacity and reliability of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), particularly in light of diminished staffing and lingering distrust rooted in policies from the Trump administration. While DHS remains a key federal agency tasked with assisting states in safeguarding elections from both domestic and foreign threats, its perceived credibility and operational strength have come under scrutiny.
In recent months, a number of state election leaders have voiced apprehension about relying on DHS’s cybersecurity and infrastructure security divisions, citing concerns that stem from both institutional shifts during the previous administration and ongoing resource limitations. Their worries highlight a broader issue in America’s decentralized electoral system: how state and federal agencies collaborate to protect one of democracy’s most essential functions.
During the time when Donald Trump was President, there were often disputes between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and state election officials. Although the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) was established in 2018 as a part of DHS to help safeguard essential infrastructures like election systems, Trump’s comments about the validity of elections often opposed CISA’s public declarations.
In the aftermath of the 2020 election, CISA officials asserted that the vote was secure and that there was no evidence of widespread fraud. This directly contradicted Trump’s claims of electoral misconduct, leading to the firing of CISA Director Christopher Krebs, whose dismissal shocked cybersecurity experts and public officials alike. That moment marked a turning point in the perception of DHS’s neutrality and reliability among some state governments.
Now, even with new leadership in place, the agency faces lingering skepticism, especially among those who believe that its independence may have been compromised under political pressure. As a result, certain states are hesitant to fully rely on DHS for election-related support, despite growing cyber threats targeting voter databases, election infrastructure, and public trust.
Compounding the trust issue is a decline in staffing across key divisions within DHS that provide cybersecurity assistance to state and local governments. According to internal assessments and public reporting, many cybersecurity roles remain vacant, slowing the agency’s ability to offer timely support or deploy resources during critical election periods.
For example, election officials in several states report delays in receiving DHS vulnerability assessments or intelligence briefings. These services—once seen as essential tools in preparing for cyberattacks or disinformation campaigns—have become harder to access due to limited personnel and strained coordination between federal and state actors.
In certain situations, states have looked to private cybersecurity companies or set up standalone teams to address what is seen as a lack of federal assistance. Although these actions can offer important safeguards, they might also result in uneven standards and disjointed security practices across different areas.
In response to their concerns, state election officials have sought to bolster in-house cybersecurity capabilities and forge partnerships with more trusted federal or non-governmental entities. Several states have expanded their own election security offices, hired dedicated information security officers, and increased investments in staff training and technological upgrades.
Additionally, some secretaries of state have pursued collaboration with the National Guard’s cybersecurity units or academic institutions with expertise in election integrity. These alternatives allow states to retain greater control over their systems while still benefiting from external expertise.
Even with this change, numerous states recognize that DHS still possesses useful assets, especially in areas such as threat intelligence, vulnerability assessments, and collaboration with intelligence organizations. The difficulty is in reestablishing a cooperative relationship that allows these resources to be both reliable and efficient.
Since the shift to the Biden administration, CISA has been actively working to re-establish its reputation as an impartial guardian of electoral security. With new management in place, the organization has initiated programs to reassure state authorities of its dedication to openness and impartiality. These efforts incorporate frequent threat updates, open-to-public online seminars, and local security conferences designed to address the specific needs of regional election officials.
CISA has also highlighted the significance of its position as a “reliable partner,” providing complementary services like risk evaluations, intrusion detection instruments, and guidelines for safeguarding election infrastructure. Nevertheless, the lasting effects of past disputes still influence the way certain states view and employ these resources.
To tackle these challenges, the agency is focusing on broadening its recruitment channels and enhancing collaboration with other agencies, yet restoring trust is an enduring endeavor. Election security authorities emphasize that uniformity, transparent communication, and maintaining political neutrality will be crucial for fortifying these alliances in the future.
As election-related cyber threats continue to evolve, the importance of cohesive federal-state collaboration becomes even more critical. State systems remain frequent targets of ransomware attacks, phishing campaigns, and influence operations originating from abroad. Without unified defense strategies and shared information channels, the nation’s electoral integrity may become increasingly vulnerable.
Experts warn that fragmentation in the security landscape—where each state acts independently with little coordination—can create weak points that adversaries exploit. DHS, with its broad mandate and access to federal intelligence, remains a uniquely positioned agency to support a unified response.
Yet that potential will only be realized if state officials trust the agency’s motives, capabilities, and professionalism. As one election official put it, “We don’t have the luxury of mistrust when the stakes are this high—but we do have to be cautious about who we trust.”
With the 2024 general election on the horizon, state and local election officials are working to finalize their cybersecurity strategies and logistical preparations. Whether DHS will play a central role in those plans remains an open question for several states, especially those still grappling with concerns over staffing and past political interference.
Some lawmakers have called for additional funding to bolster both DHS and state election offices, recognizing that robust defense requires investment at all levels. Others advocate for legislative reforms to clarify the agency’s responsibilities and insulate its leadership from political pressure.
Meanwhile, CISA continues to engage stakeholders, refine its messaging, and expand its support services in an effort to regain the confidence of all 50 states. The ultimate test will be whether those efforts translate into effective, trusted collaboration when the next major election cycle begins.
The legacy of past controversies and ongoing resource constraints have left some states questioning the reliability of the Department of Homeland Security’s role in election protection. While the agency remains a critical asset in the broader cybersecurity landscape, its ability to regain full trust from state officials depends on transparency, staffing improvements, and a demonstrated commitment to nonpartisan support.
As voting becomes increasingly intricate and cyber threats more advanced, it is crucial for all levels of government to collaborate in a safe manner. Lacking this cooperation, weaknesses extend beyond just the technological sphere—they become systemic, undermining the core of democratic engagement.
